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NOTES
Criminal Law
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF EPILEPTIC DRIVER WHO CAUSES
DEATH WHEN STRICKEN WITH SUDDEN EPILEPTIC "BLACKOUT"
Introduction
Many persons, both lay and professional, may be surprised to
hear that a recent New York case held an epileptic criminally neg-
ligent, under a New York penal statute, in driving a car which
killed another as a result of having lost control of his automobile
when he lost consciousness during an epileptic seizure.1 It was
shown that the driver had prior knowledge that he was subject to
such seizures which struck without warning from time to time
and rendered him unconscious and unfit to operate an automobile.
So too, many may be surprised to hear of the recent medical
developments whereby the majority of epileptics can be medically
controlled and rendered safe drivers and productive citizens.
The scope of this article is confined to a discussion of the crim-
inal liability of a person -who has prior knowledge of his epileptic
condition (or at least knowledge of an unexplained physical con-
dition that can and does render him suddenly unconscious), and
who, upon assumption of the responsibility of driving an automo-
bile on the public streets and highways, suffers a "blackout" (as
it is commonly called), and thereby causes another to be killed.
The discussion will be broken down into four sub-topics: first, a
brief sketch of the disease, epilepsy; second, the requisites of
criminal liability; third, an analysis of the criminal negligence sta-
tutes under which blackout -drivers may be prosecuted; and
fourth, a critique demonstrating that "controlled epileptics" are
safe driving risks, illustrated by the results of an adequate
drivers' licensing procedure.
What Is Epilepsy?
Epilepsy, briefly, is a chronic or continuing disease (meaning it
1 People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794 (1956).
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can possibly be controlled but never positively cured 2) char-
acterized by convulsive seizures in which there is a loss of con-
sciousness. 3 The three major types of epilepsy are:
(1) Grand mat, the most severe variety where the person be-
comes unconscious and suffers extensive convulsions during
the attack,
(2) Petit mal, where the attack is in a more mild form which in-
volves a mere temporary loss of consciousness, and
(3) Psychomotor epilepsy or "psychic" equivalents,4 where the
individual, in place of the usual convulsions or complete un-
consciousness, passes into a state of altered consciousness
characterized by automatic behavior that deprives him of
his mental competency.5
It is necessary to make clear from the outset that while gen-
eralizations in the field of epilepsy serve the purpose of acquaint-
ing the reader with the broad category of epilepsy, it is imperative
to recognize that each individual affliction of epilepsy presents its
own unique problems. Actually, there is no such thing as a true
"epileptic" any more than there is an "average human." Every
person is susceptible to epilepsy in the same manner that he is
susceptible to any other disease. Society has failed to keep cur-
rent with the progress that has been made in the control of
epilepsy. As a result, too often has a person been branded an
2 BECIMAN, PHARMACOLOGY 557 (1952). "We operate very effectively
pharmacologically in epilepsy through a considerable array of drugs that
lessen and may even completely prevent the recurrence of seizures. Un-
fortunately, we cannot specifically treat the individual attacks or cure the
disease."
3 Dr. Edward Schwade, Director: The Seizure Unit, Milwaukee, Wis.,
and Dr. William Lennox, Director: The Seizure Unit, Children's Medical
Center, Boston, Mass., have collaborated on a definition of epilepsy:
"Epilepsy is an episodic recurrent limited period of altered con-
sciousness with or without involuntary movements, not the result
of bodily disorders such as failure of circulation, low blood sugar;
emotional disturbances, or use of soporific drugs or intoxicants."
Letter from Dr. Edward D. Schwade, Director: The Seizure Unit,
Milwaukee, Wis., to the Notre Dame Lawyer, May 2, 1957, on file in
Notre Dame Law Library.
4 Also called "temporal lobe" epilepsy. Background Statement: 2d In-
ternational Colloquium on Temporal Lobe Epilepsy (March 1957).
5 SMIH ma FmIDDs, FORENSIC MEDICINE 388 (1955); Smith, Medico-Legal
Facets of Epilepsy, 31 Texas L. Rev: 765 (1953). See Carter and Merritt,
Diagnosis and Treatment of Epilepsy, 3.AJa=cAN Pa.cnoNlm 547-554 (1952);
Gibbs, Kozol and Loscalzo, A Symposium on Epilepsy, 2 MEDICAL HORIZONS
1-12 (1951).
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"epileptic" and thought to be a mentally deficient creature incap-
able of making any genuine contribution to society, that should be
refused a job and discriminated against in admission to schools.
Recent movements have been initiated in medical circles to com-
pletely abandon the name "epilepsy" and substitute a more
descriptive term, such as "Convulsive Disorder," which would
be free of the stigma which society has attached to the word
"epilepsy."6
Epileptics are a group of individuals who suffer from symptoms
that vary in their degree and manifestations, and in their causes. 7
Each case must be judged and dealt with on its own merits. The
type of attack that a given epileptic experiences may be relatively
constant (i.e., one of the three general types of epilepsy), or he
may experience a combination of any one of the three general
varieties accompanied by one or more of the multitudinous varia-
tions and sub-characteristics of grand mal, petit mal, and psycho-
motor epilepsy. Thus, in reference to the term "epileptic" it is
necessary to distinguish and recognize the wide gap that exists
between the person who suffers sporadic petit Mal attacks as an
infant, and whose attacks have not recurred in a succeeding peri-
od of years, from the person who suffers from the most chronic
grand mal type in which the attacks may follow one another to the
extent that death may result from sheer exhaustion. s Another
necessary point of emphasis is that epilepsy is not hereditary.
Contrary to the popular misconception, there is only a possible
predisposition to the disease like any one of the thousands of other
"predispositions" that are transmitted genetically.9
The importance of the problems surrounding epilepsy is best
illustrated by stating that the estimated number of epileptics in
the United States is between 800,000 and 1,500,000Y0 Stated even
more forcefully, on the basis that each epileptic in the country
came from a different family unit of five persons, over 7,500,000
Americans feel in their immediate families the direct social im-
pact of epilepsy."
6 Other groups (the United Epilepsy League and the Layman's League
Against Epilepsy) sought to change the name of the disease to "Cerebral
Dysrhthmia."
7 One of the most frequent misconceptions concerning the epileptic is
that he has an inferior intellect. An epileptic's intellectual capacity varies
the same as other persons. Report 36, Group for Advancement of Psychiatry
138 (1957); Sm!rH AN FIDDES, FoRENslc MEDICINE 388 (1955).
8 GRaAwoI-L, LEGAL MIEDICINE 178 (1954).
9 2 GRAY, ArromErs Tmxsoox OF MDcmE § 100.04 (3d ed. 1951).
30 FAaING AN BuRRow, EpnxrsY AN THE LAw 3 (1956).
11 Ibid.
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The Nature of Criminal liability
The common law, insofar as it imposes penal liability and de-
fines crimes, has in all states been modified or completely super-
ceded by statute.' 2 In a number of states all penal law has been
codified' 3 although in the absence of legislation the driver of a
motor vehicle may still incur criminal responsibility for all de-
grees of homicides.' 4 A crime or criminal offense is defined as
"any act or omission prohibited by public law for the protection
of the public, and made punishable by the state in a judicial pro-
ceeding in its own name."'15 Generally, there is no crime com-
mitted unless there is present the so-called mens rea or criminal
intent. This element is a requisite for the imposition of penal
liability. As a result this criminal intent must be found in criminal
negligence actions.' 6 Yet the term "intent" is sometimes mislead-
ing as it may be in many cases contrary to the defendant's real
intention.' 7 Some light is shed on this matter by saying that a
person is deemed in the eyes of the law to intend the conse-
quences of his acts. Actually what is meant i that a person will be
held legally responsible for his acts if he possessed the necessary
mental competence when he began the criminal act. Thus, the req-
uisites of criminal liability are present when the provisions of a
penal statute are violated which are "sufficiently explicit to in-
form those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties.. .. "Is
Criminal Negligence Statutes Under Which "Blackout"
Drivers May Be Prosecuted
The majority of states have enacted penal statutes whereby
"reckless or culpably negligent" drivers may be prosecuted who
32 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRnus § 14 (5th ed. 1952).
33 Included are: Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas. CLARK AND MARSHALL,
CPiEs § 14 (5th ed. 1952).
'1 Cockrell v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 218, 117 S.W.2d 1105 (1938); the case
involved a general statute.
35 CLARK AND MARsHmLL, Canaxs § 1 (5th ed. 1952). Cf. People v. Bearden,
290 N.Y. 478, 49 N.E.2d 785 (1943); Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500,
143 N.E. 322 (1924).
16 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRnMs § 40 (5th ed. 1952).
'7 This is the situation in almost all of the "blackout" cases, since it is
assumed that the driver did not intentionally become incapacitated at the
wheel.
18 Connally v. General Constr. Co, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925).
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have caused the death of another by their negligence.Y9 The re-
quirements for criminal negligence may vary in degree in the
individual states, but typical of the various statutes is New York
Penal Law § 1053-a:
A person who operates or drives any vehicle of any kind in a reck-
less or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is killed,
is guilty of criminal negligence in operation of a vehicle resulting
in death.
The punishment for violating § 1053-a is "imprisonment for a
term not exceeding five years or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, or by both."'20 Other state statutes have used the
words "reckless or grossly negligent manner,"'2 ' or "carelessly
and heedlessly, in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or
safety of others,"2 2 in defining the amount and type of negligence
necessary to constitute a violation of the particular penal statute
of the state. There is close similarity in terminology and import
between the statutes of the various states which provide for
criminal negligence on the part of motorists. Some statutes were
specifically enacted (N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1053-a) to prosecute the
death-dealing culpably negligent motorist who had so successfully
avoided being convicted under manslaughter statutes, which pro-
vide a much heavier punishment.23 The New York Court of Ap-
peals in construing § 1053-a said: 24
19 Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., La., Md., Mich.,
Minn., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Ore., S. C., Tex., Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. See
Note, 8 VAND. L. Rsv. 888 (1955); 30 CI.-KENT L. REv. 155 (1952).
20 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1053-b.
21 Mmw. STAT. ANN. § 169.11 (Supp. 1956), entitled Criminal Negligence:
"Any person who by operating or driving a vehicle of any kind in a
reckless or grossly negligent manner causes a human being to be
killed under circumstances not constituting murder in the first,
second degree, or third degree, or manslaughter in the first or second
degree, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle
resulting in death."
22 N. J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-9 (1956):
"Any person who causes death of another by driving a vehicle
carelessly and heedlessly, in willful or wanton disregard of the
rights or safety of others, is guilty of a misdemeanor; but no record
of a judgment or conviction hereunder shall be admissible in a civil
action for damages arising out of the accident in which the death
occurred."
23 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1051: "Manslaughter in the first degree is punish-
able by imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years." N. Y. PENAL
LAW § 1053: "Manslaughter in the second degree is punishable by imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding fifteen years, or by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars, or by both."
24 People v. Bearden, 290 N.Y. 478, 49 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1943).
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The word "reckless" and the phrase "culpably negligent manner",
as employed in the penal statute quoted above connote something
more than the slight negligence necessary to support a civil action
for damages. Both word and phrase import a disregard by the
accused of the consequences of his act-an indifference to the
rights of others.25
To constitute the crime of criminal negligence in the operation
of a vehicle resulting in death by "reckless" or "culpably negli-
gent" driving, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knew, or should have known, that his manner of
driving the vehicle involved a reasonable probability of serious
bodily harm or death.2
6
In People v. Ecker,2 7 the New York Court of Appeals for the
first time construed the applicability of its "reckless driving
statute" to an epileptic who suffered a blackout. The court held
that an epileptic who knew of his incapacitating condition prior
to a death-resulting accident was liable for driving a car in a
"reckless or culpably negligent manner" in violation of the above
25 Uniformly interpreted in: People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273
(1932); People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927); People v. Gard-
ner, 225 App. Div. 683, 8 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1939).
26 Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 111, 242 Pac. 270, 272 (1925) wherein the
court said in the prosecution of an automobile driver for "culpably negli-
gence":
"By no means every instance where one person is injured or killed
by a vehicle driven by another do the circumstances constitute a
crime. There must be negligence rising to the degree of criminal or
culpable negligence. The culpability of a defendant is a question of
fact for the jury, and the test is: Do the acts charged as criminal
show a degree of carelessness amounting to a culpable disregard of
the rights and safety of others, and did said acts cause the death of
the deceased? If so, it establishes a case of criminal negligence ....
The highways of the state are common property of all, and by what-
ever method or conveyance they are used for travel, persons upon
the highways have equal rights. In exercising these rights, each must
have regard for the rights of others. The law gives the right to use
the highways for travel by automobile, but this right is limited to
doing so in a legal and prudent manner, and when a person drives
upon the highway in the exercise of such right in a negligent man-
ner, so that his negligence affects others likewise lawfully upon
the highway to their injury, he becomes liable to the injured party,
and, if the degree of negligence with which the act is done is cul-
pable within the meaning of the law, he becomes liable to the state
for criminial negligence." See also State v. Diamond, 16 N.J. Super.
26, 83 A.2d 799 (1951); State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 159, 21 N.W.2d
480 (1946); People v. Bearden, 290 N.Y. 478, 49 N.E.2d 785 (1943);
Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500, 143 N.E. 322 (1924).
27 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794 (1956).
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section of the New York Penal Law.28
Defendant Eckert was indicted for driving a car in a culpably
negligent manner which resulted in the death of a seventeen year
old girl. Defendant contested the sufficiency of the indictment on
three grounds, two of which were concerned with the doctor-
patient privilege of establishing the prior warning not to drive and
evidence that the defendant suffered an epileptic attack at the
time of the accident. The third attack was based on the sufficiency
of the evidence that his automobile caused the death.
The court ruled29 that the statements by the defendant's doc-
tor were privileged,30 but that there was sufficient competent evi-
dence to constitute the elements of the alleged crime without its
introduction. Defendant admitted his prior history of epilepsy 31
and from this admission it may be inferred that he suffered a
blackout just before the accident ("something happened and from
there I can't tell you") .32 This statement with other competent evi-
dence in the record was sufficient evidence to establish guilt if the
circumstantial evidence met two tests: (1) "the facts from which
the inferences of the accused's guilt are drawn must be satis-
factorily established", and (2) "they must not only be incon-
sistent with innocence, but must exclude to a moral certainty
every other reasonable hypothesis but guilt."33 Thus, the court
said it was unable to rule that the legal evidence was insufficient
to quash the indictment of the grand jury since the legislature
specifically relegated the question of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support a conviction in a jury trial to "the judgment
of the Grand Jury."3 - But on appeal, the court stated that if no
violation of the statute was disclosed it would set aside the grand
jury's judgment, since the court was dealing with a case of first
impression with which exceptional care must be exhibited. The
28 Id. at 797.
29 Id. at 796.
30 Because of the exclusion of such evidence in People v. Decina, 2 Misc.
2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956), decided on the same day as People v. Eckert,
mpra, note 27, the indictment was dismissed. In 80 N.J.L.J. 1 (1957) there
is cited the introduction of a bill in the N.Y. State Legislature which would
eliminate the physician-patient privilege in any prosecution for criminal neg-
ligence under N.Y. Penal Law § 1053-a, "as the result of two recent New
York decisions," citing People v. Eckert and People v. Decina.
31 People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 137 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1956).
32 Brief for Respondent, p. 16, People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E2d
794 (1956).
33 People v. Eckert, supra note 31 at 796.
34 Brief for Respondent, p. 16, People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d
794 (1956).
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"exceptional care" to be exhibited in Eckert meant examining
the record and indictment in light of the strict requirements set
forth in N.Y. PsN. LAW § 1053-a, and strictly construing these
requisites in view of its penal provisions. The court restated the
judicial unanimity of construction given the term "reckless driv-
ing" as the operation of an automobile under such circumstances
as to show a reckless disregard of the consequences. "Culpable
negligence" was defined as a disregard of the consequences which
may result from an act and an indifference to the rights of others.
The court traced the definite and certain meanings of these terms
beginning with People v. Ange035 and People v. Grogan.30
Conceding the insufficiency of ordinary negligence to sustain
a conviction bised on carelessness, lack of skill, or foresight, the
court in Eckert summed up the requirements necessary to con-
stitute criminal negligence in driving an automobile by saying:
[T~his conduct arises when the actor has knowledge of the highly
dangerous nature of his actions or knowledge of such facts as under
the circumstances would disclose to a reasonable man the dangerous
character of his action, and despite this knowledge he so acts. That
he does not view his conduct as dangerous is of no consequence....
To be dangerous his conduct must involve a reasonable probability
of serious bodily harm or death. This of course, turns upon the
particular circumstances of the case. These limitations preclude suc-
cessful prosecution simply upon a showing that a driver killed
another while his car was out of control due to a blackout resulting
from one of the numerous diseases or afflictions which may cause
such a blackout. 3 7
The final consideration in fulfilling the requirements of § 1053-a
-was whether or not the driver (who in the instant case suffered
a sudden epileptic blackout prior .to the accident) need be
conscious at the time of the fatal accident in order to be prose-
cuted under its provisions. The court illustrated its answer by
saying that an intoxicated driver could be prosecuted under N.Y.
PEr. LAw § 1053-a whether he was conscious or unconscious. It
said the phrase "operates or drives" applies not only "to the
conscious manipulation of the controls of the vehicle," or "to
the condition of the driver, but to the condition of the vehicle
and to traffic conditions as well. 38 Thus, an epileptic driver who
had previous warnings of his susceptibility to blackouts was on
notice that by driving an automobile he would subject the lawful
35 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1924).
36 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273 (1932).
37 People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d at 797-98 (1956).
'8 Id. at 798.
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persons on the public streets and highways to an unreasonable
risk and he is thereby held to be criminally negligent if he
assumed the responsibility of driving and subsequently killed
someone.
A strong dissent by Mr. Justice Desmond in People v. Decina39'
(decided the same day as Eckert) attacked the majority opinion
in both Decina and Eckert on the grounds that "operates" as used
in § 1053-a presupposes volition and consciousness, and that one
cannot be "reckless or culpably negligent" unless one is conscious.
A resolving of the question involves a matter of statutory con-
struction which the dissent contends is penalization of "conscious
operation" only. The dissent stated:
It is significant that until this case (and the Eckert case .. .) no
attempt was ever made to penalize, either under section 1053-a or
as manslaughter, the wrong done by one whose foreseeable black-
out while driving had consequences fatal to another person.
... IN]either of the two statutes has ever been thought until
now to make it a crime to drive a car when one is subject to attacks
or seizures such as are incident to certain forms and levels of
epilepsy and other diseases and conditions.40
What the dissent seems most concerned with is the possible,
extension of § 1053-a to all other fields of physical incapacity
whereby a person may suddenly blackout or lose control of his.
vehicle. Specifically mentioned were "epilepsy, coronary involve-
ments, circulatory diseases, nephritis, uremic poisoning, diabetes,
meniere's syndrome, a tendency to fits of sneezing, locking of the,
knees, muscular contractions. . . ."41 Other types of physical in-
capacities that could be added to this list are prior menstrual
tensions 42 (which may cause sudden unconsciousness), a sudden
mental derangement, fainting from a number of causes, an ex-
cessive dose of a sedative or a drug-like amphetamine which
keeps the user awake beyond the limits of his ability to operate
properly, and, finally, the intemperate use of alcohol which, un-
doubtedly, is the greatest cause of fatal traffic accidents.43
The writer is of the opinion that the "reckless driving" statutes
in the various states should be used (as § 1053-a was used in
39 2 Misc. 2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799 at 807 (1956).
40 Id. at 799, 808.
41 Ibid.
4 Stewart, Premenstrual Tension in Automobile Accidents, 6 CLsv.-MAa.
L. REv. 17 (1957).
43 Letter from W. G. Lennox, M.D., Associate Prof. of Neurology, Harvard
Medical School, The Neurological Institute, Children's Medical Center (Di-
rector of the Seizure Unit), Boston, Mass., to the Notre Dame Lawyer, April!
8, 1957, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
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Eckert) as a means of prosecuting any motorist who kills another
as a result of a blackout from a known physical impairment which
renders his driving culpably unsafe. The fear of the dissent that
unwarranted criminal prosecutions will be made in all death-
resulting "blackout" cases under § 1053-a is somewhat doubtful.
This section was enacted as a means of prosecuting all death-
dealing motorists who are criminally negligent. But in order to
be prosecuted under its provisions the drives must be found to be
"reckless" or "culpable," in his driving which leads up to and
includes the sudden incapacity. Limited in this manner it can be
said that no epileptic, nor any other person suffering from any of
the numerous physical impairments that may cause a sudden
blackout, will be prosecuted criminally under the various statutes
where it is shown that the blackout could not reasonably have
been anticipated.
This lack of criminal negligence is shown most clearly by a
record evincing a complete absence of previous attacks. Where
previous attacks have marred the driver's record, the lack of
culpability or recklessness may be shown by medical proof that
the driver had a clear record of no attacks for a "substantial"
period44 before the accident and had been advised by a competent
physician that it was safe for him to drive. In the area between
these two instances of non-criminal liability and the criminal
responsibility as found in Eckert, it is necessary to leave the
matter in the hands of the grand jurors who test the indictment
and the twelve men at the trial who are triers of the facts, to
determine whether or not the suddenly incapacitated driver was
criminally negligent.
The dissent in People v. Decina states that "any consideration
of driving while intoxicated or while sleepy" is without pertinence
"since those are conditions presently known to the driver, not
mere future possibilities or probabilities."45 The writer submits
this is a distinction without substance and that both intoxication
and falling asleep are analogous to the present discussion.46 The
44 The usual period recommended by sound medical authority is from
one to three years. Wisconsin has one of the most effective procedures in
the country for issuing licenses. The seizure-free period for epileptics has
been set at two years. Wis. STAT. § 85.08 (6) (1955). See FA~inG AND BURRow,
EPxPsY AmN THE LAW 35-61 (1956), where the driver's license laws in re-
lation to the epileptic are extensively analysed.
45 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 809 (1956).
46 Wilson v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 262, 105 P.2d 789 (1940). In this case
the court affirmed a conviction under a manslaughter statute on culpable
negligence and said:
Continued on page 698
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criminal liability in Eckert was predicated on the present knowl-
edge of the epileptic before the accident meaning that if he
drove an automobile knowing he was subject to frequent epileptic
seizures, such driving would be in reckless disregard of the conse-
quences that would ensue from such a seizure. The court in
Eckert was not attempting to punish a person who experienced a
solitary blackout from unknown causes, but only those motorists
who actually knew of their condition and drove notwithstanding
such knowledge. The criminal negligence is found in the "devil-
may-care" attitude which a person assumes when another's life
is at stake.4 7 Criminal negligence is readily apparent in the per-
son who drives either when intoxicated or when in danger of
falling asleep,48 but no more apparent than in the person who
drives even though he has a present knowledge of an inca-
pacitating affliction that may without warning render him un-
conscious. Unconsciousness that results from either intoxication
or sleepiness is a mere "possibility or probability" until it
strikes, the same as in any incapacitating disease. The degree of
control that the driver has in inducing the incapacitating condi-
tion has been mentioned as another distinction between in-
".... [OJne may be guilty of culpable and criminal negligence re-
gardless of the fact as to whether he was drinking or not. An auto-
mobile in the hands of a person who handles the same in a reckless
or careless manner, and in an utter disregard of the lives of others,
is just as guilty under the statute as one who handles it while in
an intoxicated condition . . . The great number of high-powered
automobiles upon the streets and highways of this state demand a
respect for the rights of others, and a greater responsibility for
those who drive them. It is too late to cry 'accident' after one has
been guilty of culpable and criminal negligence and others have
been injured or killed." 105 P.2d at 792.
See State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951), which compared
Meniere's Syndrome with epilepsy and falling asleep and considered them
in the same light as the "nearest approach" to the same solution.
47 Kaufman and Kantrowitz, The Case of the Sleeping Motorist, 25
N.Y.U.L.Q. Rsv. 362, 368 (1950), where the writers concluded:
"The motorist should continue to be judged by the reasonable man
test as to all of his acts in driving. He should not be liable unless
he drives carelessly. But when he goes insane, faints or falls asleep
while propelling his automobile along the highway, he ceases to be
a driver. The risks of his ceasing to be a driver should be borne by
him and not by the hopeless individual who gets hit.. . . You must,
at your peril, stay sane and conscious as you sit behind the wheel
with the ignition on, the brakes off and your foot on the gas pedal."
48 See excellent annotations: Automobiles -Illness or Drowsiness, 28
A.L.R.2d 12 (1953); degree or nature of intoxication for purposes of statute
or ordinance making it a criminal offense to operate an automobile while
in that condition, 142 A.L.R. 555 (1943).
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toxication and the "physical" blackout attacks, but this is merely
another factor to be weighed in determining criminal negligence
in much the same manner that the failure of a controlled epileptic
or diabetic to take their medicine (which lessens the possibility
of a blackout) would enter into a finding of criminal negligence.
Because an epileptic was the subject of the criminal negligence
prosecution in People v. Eckert should not mean that epilepsy
is to be the whipping boy for all other blackout sicknesses. Those
with such physical infirmities are equally culpable in driving
with knowledge that evinces a complete disregard of the conse-
quences of such reckless conduct. These incapacitating physical
conditions should be equally subject to the various "reckless
driving" statutes in the various states. The first case in which the
state criminally prosecuted a motorist after he suffered a black-
out and seriously Ijured another was Tift v. State,4 9 where the
court held the driver guilty of assault and battery when he
knew of his vertigo50 condition and still continued to drive at
high speeds.
Throughout the years the courts have been very hesitant in
attaching any liability whatsoever, criminally or civilly, to the
driver who suffers a sudden blackout because some volitional act
of negligence is a prerequisite to liability and, where the driver is
unconscious, to find such act is almost impossible. Wherever civil
or criminal liability has been found in the various blackout
cases it has been predicated on the antecedent negligence of un-
dertaking to drive.51 In People v. Freeman,5 2 the lower court's
49 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916).
50 "Dizziness or swimming of the head." MAsoy, MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY FoR
LAwYERS 566 (2d ed. 1951).
51 In each of these cases the liability or non-liability turned on the
driver's prior knowledge of his incapacitating condition. (1) Civil cases:
Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy Corp., 55 Cal. App. 2d 675, 131 P.2d 588 (1942);
Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925); Steele v. Lackey,
107 Vt. 192, 177 AUt. 309 (1935); Keller v. Worn, 87 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1955);
Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 263 Wis. 633, 58
N.W.2d 424 (1953); Eleason v. Western Cas. and Surety Co., 254 Wis. 134,
35 N.W.2d 301 (1949). See Smith, Medico-Legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31
TEXAs L. Rlv. 765, 773 (1953). (2) Criminal cases: People v. Freeman, 61
Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943); State v. Johnson, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d
671 (1941); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951); State v.
Olsen, 180 Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427 (1945). See Blashfield's Cyc. of Automobile
Law § 16 (perm. ed.):
"While the condition of the mind of the person injuring another
is not to be regarded in determining liability within the proper field
of the doctrines of negligence, yet those doctrines of necessity pre-
Continued on page 700
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conviction under California's "negligent homicide" statute was
reversed as the defendant driver was found to be unconscious
due to epilepsy, throughout the entire drive.
The case drawing the closest parallel to the unique holding of
New York in People v. Eckert, is State v. Gooze 53 which upheld
a criminal conviction under § 2A: 113-9 of the New Jersey re-
vised statutes providing for a misdemeanor in causing death of
another by driving in a willful and wanton disregard for the
safety of others.54 The New Jersey Superior Court held that the
act of driving an automobile by one who had previous knowledge
of Meniere's Syndrome5 5 which rendered him susceptible to sud-
den blackouts constituted an act of "wantonness" within the
meaning of the above statute. The court reiterated the basic rule
that the negligence required to support a criminal charge is
"more than ordinary common law negligence and is something
more and greater in degree than negligence to impose civil lia-
bility." The "reckless disregard of the consequences" requisite
of criminal negligence was partially founded on the testimony
of a neurologist that defendant had been examined by him a
year prior to the accident as a result of a sudden attack of dizzi-
ness or unconsciousness suffered by the defendant while at home.
After the examination, defendant was warned not to drive alone
because of the serious consequences that might ensue. As a re-
sult of this testimony the court said: 5 6
In driving his automobile alone on a through-state highway with
knowledge that he might at any time suddenly, without warning, lose
consciousness or suffer a dizzy spell, and having been cautioned not
to drive alone, constituted an act of wantonness and a disregard
of the rights or safety of others. It was reasonably foreseeable that
suppose that the person whom it is sought to charge is capable of
sense, perception, and judgment.
"One who, stricken by paralysis or seized by an epileptic fit, still
continues with his hands on the wheel of an automobile which he
is driving, and unconscious, so directs it as to cause its collision with
another, cannot be held negligent for the way in which he controls
it, and no more can he who exercises a like direction after he has
been overtaken by sleep. In such case any negligence of the driver
must be predicated upon his conduct in permitting himself to fall
asleep."
52 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943).
53 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951).
54 N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-9 (Supp. 1956), quoted in full, supra note 22.
55 "A condition in which there is inflamation and congestion of the semi-
circular canals of the ear . . . characterized by vertigo (dizziness)...
MALO Y, MEDICAL DICTIOxARY FoR LAwYERs 187 (1951).
56 State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811, 816 (1951).
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if he "blacked out" or became dizzy without warning, its probable
consequences might well be injury or death to others.
The court also mentioned the uniqueness of the case and
pointed out that the criminal character of defendant's conduct
was not lessened by the fact that he did not intend to harm
another.57 The fact that the dizziness failed to recur during the
year which lapsed between the accident and the time defendant
was actually put on notice of the existence of the disease was not
a mitigating circumstance. It was noted by the court that neither
counsel nor the court was able to produce a single case directly
on point: 58 "Probably the nearest approach are the cases that
deal with one operating a car while asleep or suffering from
epilepsy." The court proceeded to review the unanimous principle
that a driver is grossly negligent in falling asleep at the wheel if
he had a prior warning of the likelihood of sleep,59 and stated
that the awareness of the defendant of his condition in the instant
57 In People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 NXE.2d 799 at 803 (1956), the
court states, in construing the New York "criminal negligence" statute §
1053-a, that:
"[T]he statute does not require that a defendant must deliberately
intend to kill a human being, for that would be murder. Nor does
the statute require that he knowingly and consciously follow the
precise path that leads to death and destruction. It is sufficient, we
have said, when his conduct manifests a disregard of the conse-
quences which may ensue from the act, and an indifference to the
rights of others."
In Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500, 143 N.E. 322 (1924), the de-
fendant was convicted criminally for operating his automobile in violation
of the state "reckless driving" statute and the court stated, 143 N.E. at 325:
"The statute according to its plain words makes the act of operat-
ing a motor vehicle in a way 'so that the lives or -safety of the pub-
lic might be endangered' a criminal offense. It is that act which
is penalized. The intent with which the act is done is an inma-
terial factor .... The only fact to be determined is whether the
defendant did the prohibited act.... The moral turpitude or purity
of the notice by which it was prompted, and the knowledge or
ignorance of its criminal character, are immaterial on the question
of guilt."
The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute as "definite" and not
against the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
58 State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811, 816 (1951).
59 Ibid. In State v. Mundy, 243 N.C. 149, 90 SE.2d 312 (1955), a new
trial was granted on a conviction for manslaughter where a passenger was
killed when the driver fell asleep and the court said, 90 S.E2d at 315:
"In determining the question of culpable negligence, the focal point
of inquiry is whether the operator, because of drowsiness, previous
tiring activities, or other premonitory symptoms of sleep, became
Continued on page 702
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case was sufficient to constitute a statutory offense under N.J.
REv. STAT. § 2A: 113-9 (Supp. 1956).60 since:
... [W~e are convinced that the defendant was fully aware of the
disease of which he was suffering; that he was specifically warned by
Dr. Madonick that he might suffer a recurrence or suddenly "black
out" or become unconscious and, therefore, should be careful about
driving alone; that in the face of this knowledge of his disease and
aware of the likelihood of falling asleep, but nevertheless con-
tinued to operate the vehicle under circumstances evincing a
thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference
to the rights and safety of others upon the highway, proximately
resulting in injury or death."
In State v. Champ, 172 Kan. 737, 242 P.2d 1070 (1952), information was held
sufficient that charged driver with manslaughter under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 21-
420 (1949), when driver fell asleep with prior knowledge of condition. In
State v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427 (1945), a criminal conviction for
manslaughter was affirmed where the driver fell asleep, wherein the court
said 160 P.2d at 428:
"The burden of the foregoing authorities is overwhelmingly that
the fact of going to sleep at the wheel of an automobile, without
more, at least presents a question for the jury as to whether the
driver was negligent. We think this is a sound and salutary rule,
for while one cannot be liable for what he does during the uncon-
sciousness of sleep, he is responsible for allowing himself to go to
sleep - to get into a condition where the accident could happen
without his being aware of it, or able to avoid it."
In the concurring opinion, 160 P.2d at 429, the point of prior negligence was
further pointed out:
"When the driver of an automobile falls asleep at the wheel, courts
in civil cases have, in addition to the fact of sleep, paid particular
attention to the preceding events to determine whether or not the
driver was negligent in continuing to operate the automobile."
The court then said that in this criminal prosecution,
"The focal point of inquiry then must be whether or not the driver
continued to operate the automobile after, such prior warning of
the likelihood of sleep so that continuing to drive constituted
marked disregard of the safety of others."
In Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671 (1941), the court upheld a
conviction of manslaughter where the driver fell asleep after prior knowl-
edge of his condition since
"... [H]e had just prior to the accident fallen asleep.... There-
fore he knew he was in no condition to operate a motor vehicle and
he knew that by operating such vehicle in such place while he was
in such condition he thereby endangered the lives of all people
travelling on such highway. When the accused assumed to do this
he was guilty of criminal negligence ..
See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 12, 62 (1953).
60 New Jersey Statute quoted in full, supra note 22.
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the danger of recurrence, he deliberately got behind the wheel of an
automobile and operated it upon a very busy highway when a re-
curring attack occurred, causing him to lose control of his automo-
bile and to crash into other automobiles and to destroy ... the life
of the operator of one of those cars. We think the facts dearly bring
the defendant's conduct within the condemnation of the statute in
question.6 '
In view of the foregoing cases and the existence of the numerous
"reckless driving" statutes throughout the states, indications
are that criminal prosecutions of drivers who kill another as
a result of a blackout (when they have had prior knowledge
of their incapacity) will be a more frequent occurrence in
the future. No one should attempt to drive an automobile upon
the public streets who is subject to any type of infirmity which
may suddenly render him incapable of driving safely. The answer
for the epileptic who may be subject to seizure attacks is to com-
pletely refrain from driving6 2 and immediately put himself under
a doctor's care.6 3 With the medical advances made in the diagnosis
and control of epilepsy during recent years, the odds are ex-
cellent that the attacks can be completely controlled and the
epileptic rendered a safe driving risk.
"Controlled" Epileptics Make Safe Driving Risks
The statement that "once an epileptic always an epileptic"
61 State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811, 817 (1951).
62 Hiernons, The Epileptic Driver, 1 BRnsH MEDICAL JOUNAL 206 (1956),
states at 207:
"It will be generally agreed that those liable to attacks should never
have charge of a vehicle. Epileptics who continue driving should
be warned of the very serious risks they are taking, and should also
realize they are breaking the law. Even patients who claim that
their auras are long enough to allow them to stop in good time
should also be advised to give up driving. We know that such warn-
ings cannot be relied upon to occur on every occasion."
Another sound reason for the epileptic to refrain from driving is that a
seizure may be induced, which ordinarily would not have occurred, by one
of the many emergency situations that are everyday experiences in modern
high speed driving. These experiences may range from a child running
into the street to a sudden change of direction in a passing car, or to a
mechanical failure or blowout, anyone of which are capable of causing the
psychic effect necessary to bring on a seizure. See 2 GRAY, ATTORNEYs
TEXTBOOK OF MEDIcINE § 100.11 (3d ed. 1951).
63 Every epileptic should be encouraged to join or contact one of the lay-
professional organizations fighting the disease. Four such organizations are:
The American League Against Epilepsy, The Laymen's League Against
Epilepsy, The National Epilepsy League, and The United Epilepsy Asso-
ciation.
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should be discarded in light of the medical progress that seizures
can be completely controlled in 50 percent of the cases and
substantially controlled in an additional 30 percent of the cases.
This "control" of epilepsy is primarily effectuated through the
skillful diagnosis and treatment of the individual epileptic by the
use of a wide variety of recently developed anti-seizure (or anti-
convulsant) drugs.6 Letters to the writer from leading neurolo-
gists indicate these figures are not exaggerated, but in fact tend
to be rather conservative.6 5 The modem medical progress in
treating epileptic seizures calls for a re-evaluation of our laws
and administrative practices that govern the issuance of drivers'
licenses to persons with a previous record of seizures. All states,
except one, 66 either prohibit the issuance of driver's licenses to
epileptics or provide for a limited license by qualification.67 In
sixteen states the name "epileptic" is specifically used in denying
a license and in the remaining thirty-two states the denial is
based on the administrative discretion to deny licenses to "unsafe
drivers." A history of epilepsy must be disclosed in license ap-
plications in most states. The effect which such a statute has on
former epileptics, or as they are called in the medical profession
"controlled" epileptics, is to encourage them either to abstain
from medical attention in those states requiring a physician to
report the disease, or to perjure themselves if they desire to
obtain a license.68 A number of physicians69 have voiced their
disapproval of such reporting on the grounds it is a violation of
the physician-patient privilege and also it induces the epileptic
to by-pass medical care. Some states require that an epileptic
should not have used medicine for a designated period prior to the
issuance of a license, which as Lennox says is as absurd as "say-
64 BECKMAN, PHARMACOLOGY 557 (1952): "Drugs and Sources. The prin-
cipal agents are Phenobarbital, Dilantin, Mesantoin, Tritione, Paradione,
Phenurone and Thiantoin. These drugs are all prepared in the laboratory,
none being obtained from natural sources. Bromides, in use before any of
them, are still occasionally employed when the others fail."
65 Letters on file at the Notre Dame Law Library.
66 Fundamentally, only South Dakota has a registration requirement
and does not require an examination or qualification of the applicant. S.D.
CODE title 44, c. 249 (1953).
67 See FABinG AND BuRRow, Epi'PsY ANw THD LAw 40 (1956).
68 Seven states (Cal., Conn., Del., Ind., Nev., N. J., and Ore.) require
physicians to report epilepsy to administrative officials.
69 Hiernons, The Epileptic Driver, 1 BRTISH MEDICAL JoURNAL 206 (1956)
states categorically, ".... I do not believe that the doctor should give in-
formation to the motor-licensing authorities of patients suffering from
epilepsy . . .where epilepsy is a reportable disease."
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ing that a person with a visual defect should not wear glasses."70
A procedure should be adopted in every state whereby a per-
son with a history of seizures who has since become a safe driving
risk, in the opinion of a competent physician, can apply for a
driving permit. Wisconsin has adopted such a procedure7 ' which
has proven very satisfactory72 and worthy of adoption by other
states. Under its provisions, a license is issued upon the recom-
mendation of the attending doctor that the patient is under
treatment and free of seizures. The seizure-free period is set at
two years. If the preliminary application is denied a "controlled"
epileptic may have his application reviewed by an administrative
board composed of a licensing official and two physicians qaulified
in the field of epilepsy. The board review is binding on the li-
censing official.7 3 On such review the applicant is granted a
driving permit good for six months which is renewed upon the
attending physician's recommendations. One of the considera-
tions in issuing such licenses is the applicant's eligibility for lia-
bility insurance. Upon the board's certification, epileptics have
had little difficulty in obtaining full liability coverage at only a
five percent increase in premiums. Wisconsin has had such
success with this licensing procedure that in 1955 their compulsory
reporting statute was repealed.74 Such a procedure for the issu-
ance of drivers' licenses to "controlled" epileptics would in-
crease driving safety since only those epileptics who were recom-
mended by a physician as being "controlled" would be issued
licenses. As Fabing and Burrow have stated:
[T]he natural reaction to such a fair procedure would be for the
epileptic to seek treatment and, after his seizures had been con-
trolled for a reasonable period of time, to make application for a
license, fully disclosing the history of seizures, treatment, and con-
trol. Under the fairest of procedures, of course, it must be expected
that some who are found to be unsafe drivers will drive surrep-
titiously, as they now do. Coupling a fair procedure with one's sense
of fair play, however, may be expected to achieve a far greater
degree of traffic safety than presently exists.75
70 Letter from W. G. Lennox, Associate Prof. of Neurology, Harvard
Medical School, The Neurological Institute, Children's Medical Center
(Director of the Seizure Unit), Boston, Mass., to the Notre Dame Lawyer,
April 8, 1957, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
71 Wis. STAT. § 85.08 (6) (1949).
72 Of over 360 licenses issued on the basis of being certified or on appeal,
only two were withdrawn because of any recurrence of epileptic seizures.
FABING AND BuRRow, EPIEPsY AND TE LAW 53 (1956).
73 Ibid.
74 Chap. 534, Laws of 1955, repealing Wis. STAT. § 146.23 (1949).
75 FABING AND Buraow, EPILESY AND Tm LAW 38-39 (1956).
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A complete freedom from seizures is not the only factor taken
into consideration in evaluating an epileptic as a safe driving
risk.7 6 Because of these additional factors an overall medical
recommendation by a competent physician is a necessity. Even
by the use of the electroencephalogram (a delicate machine that
records the most minute brain waves), a physical seizure may
not be recorded, or conversely a brain wave irregularity may be
evident without a physical manifestation. This is true although
the electroencephalogram is considered the most important of
all ancilliary procedures that can be utilized in the diagnosis of
epilepsy. 77 Its diagnostic use is quite flexible and can divulge a
variety of facts to the skillful medical practitioner. As Lennox
says:
The EEG records different degrees of abnormality, suggests the
presence of different types of seizures based on the pattern made
by the waves. It is useful in locating the part of the brain prin-
cipally affected and properly used can aid in the determination of
the seriousness of the case, progress of therapy and something about
the prognosis.... On the other hand as already indicated, it does
not necessarily correlate with the physical evidence of seizures.
It may be normal in the presence of a person with undoubted
epilepsy or abnormal when there is no history of seizures.78
In light of the medical progress in controlling epilepsy to the
point where the chance of suffering a solitary seizure is negligible,
a "controlled" epileptic should be able to lawfully obtain a
driver's license. Eighteen states grant license to epileptics on
76 As W. G. Lennox enumerated in a recent article, Epilepsy and the
Epileptic, 162 AimE. MEDICAL J. 118 (1956).
"[Tlhe interval of time since the last seizure (at least 18 months);
the age at onset of seizures and the former type and frequency of
these; the constancy and the duration of the warning aura; the
time of seizures, whether they occur only at night; the degree of
abnormality of the electroenciphalogram; the person's veracity and
sobriety; the person's adherence to prescribed treatment; and the
amount and kind of the expected driving."
77 Carter and Merritt, Diagnosis and Treatment of Epilepsy, 3 AMMERCAN
PRAcTIONER 549 (1952).
78 Letter from W. G. Lennox, M.D., Associate Prof. of Neurology, Harvard
Medical School, The Neurological Institute, Children's Medical Center (Di-
rector of the Seizure Unit), Boston, Mass., to the Notre Dame Lawyer,
April 8, 1957, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
"It is now recognized epileptic attacks are the result of extreme
activity within a part or of the entire brain. Proof lies in the modern
use of the electroencephalograph. This agency was developed to
practical usefulness in 1935 and serves to record the passage of
electric currents produced by changes of voltage within the brain."
2 GRAY, ATToRNEYs TE=xrOOXl OF MEDICINE § 100.02 (3d ed. 1951).
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the basis of control of seizures.79 The non-seizure period upon
which individual physicians would recommend a controlled epi-
leptic as a safe driving risk varies from one to five years, with
the majority recommendation about 18 months, depending upon
the individual case.80 Of course, a complete seizure-free period
for any length of time does not mean that an unexplained black-
out will not take place. This is true of any driver on the road as
well as a "controlled" epileptic.
Conclusion
Thus, if the requisites of criminal liability are fulfilled under
the various state "reckless driving" statutes by the prior knowl-
edge of the motorist of his blackout susceptibility, a prosecution
for criminal negligence may be the result.
The consensus in the medical profession is that a "con-
trolled" epileptic is a safe driving risk. It is up to the state
legislatures to devise adequate licensing programs whereby the
epileptic will be encouraged in obtaining medical treatment with
the hope that some day he will qualify as a "safe-driving risk." At
the same time, it is necessary to impress upon the motorist-con-
scious public that any person subject to sudden "blackouts" who.
persists in driving, in reckless disregard of the rights of others
and the laws of the state, will be prosecuted under the various
state "reckless driving" statutes if a fatal accident results from a
"blackout."
Ronald Patrick Smitk
79 Ariz., Cal., Colo., Ill., Md., Mass., Mo., Mont., Nev, N. H., N. C., N. D.,
Ore., S. C., Vt., Va., Wash., and Wis.
80 New York recently inaugurated a pioneer move in accident pre-
vention by conducting a symposium on "the Medical Aspects of Motor
Vehicle Accident Prevention.' Outstanding administrative officials and
medical specialists participated in eight workshop groups. The recom-
mendations of each group are collected and reported in 56 N.Y. STATE J. OF
MF icn 3853-3882 (1956). See also 45 Ky. L. J. 215 (1957), for a symposium
on mental responsibility and the law conducted from the standpoint of
four specialists.
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